

A variant of the F4 algorithm

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Motivation

An example of algebraic cryptanalysis

Discrete logarithm problem over elliptic curves (ECDLP)

E elliptic curve over a finite field

Given $P \in E$ and $Q \in \langle P \rangle$, find x such that $Q = [x]P$

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Basic outline of index calculus method for DLP

- 1 define a factor base: $\mathcal{F} = \{P_1, \dots, P_N\}$
- 2 relation search: for random (a_i, b_i) , try to decompose $[a_i]P + [b_i]Q$ as sum of points in \mathcal{F}
- 3 linear algebra step: once $k > N$ relations found, deduce with sparse algebra techniques the DL of Q

Motivation

Cryptanalysis of the DLP on $E(\mathbb{F}_{q^n})$

Relation search on $E(\mathbb{F}_{q^n})$ - [Gaudry, Diem]

- Factor base: $\mathcal{F} = \{(x, y) \in E(\mathbb{F}_{q^n}) : x \in \mathbb{F}_q\}$
- Goal: find a least $\#\mathcal{F}$ decompositions of random combinations $R = [a]P + [b]Q$ into m points of \mathcal{F} : $R = P_1 + \dots + P_m$

Algebraic attack

- for each R , construct the corresponding polynomial system \mathcal{S}_R
 - ▶ Semaev's summation polynomials and symmetrization
 - ▶ Weil restriction: write \mathbb{F}_{q^n} as $\mathbb{F}_q[t]/(f(t))$
- $\mathcal{S}_R = \{f_1, \dots, f_n\} \subset \mathbb{F}_q[X_1, \dots, X_m]$
 - ▶ coefficients depend polynomially on x_R

each decomposition trial \leftrightarrow find the solutions of \mathcal{S}_R over \mathbb{F}_q

Polynomial system solving over finite fields

Difficult pb: how to compute $V(I)$ where $I = \langle f_1, \dots, f_r \rangle \subset \mathbb{F}_q[X_1, \dots, X_m]$?

Gröbner bases: good representations for ideals

- Convenient generators g_1, \dots, g_s of I capturing the main features of I
- $G \subset I$ is a Gröbner basis of I if $\langle LT(G) \rangle = LT(I)$

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
Gröbner basis computation

- Basic operation: computation and reduction of critical pair
 $S(p_1, p_2) = u_1 p_1 - u_2 p_2$ where $lcm = LM(p_1) \vee LM(p_2)$, $u_i = \frac{lcm}{LM(p_i)}$
- Buchberger's result: to compute a GB of I ,
 - 1 start with $G = \{f_1, \dots, f_r\}$
 - 2 iterate basic operation on all possible critical pairs of elements of G , add non-zero remainders to G

Techniques for resolution of polynomial systems

F4: efficient implementation of Buchberger's algorithm

- linear algebra to process several pairs simultaneously
- selection strategy (e.g. lowest total degree lcm)
- at each step construct a Macaulay-style matrix containing
 - ▶ products $u_i p_i$ coming from the selected critical pairs
 - ▶ polynomials from preprocessing phase



Techniques for resolution of polynomial systems

Standard Gröbner basis algorithms

- 1 F4 algorithm (Faugère '99)
 - ▶ fast and complete reductions of critical pairs
 - ▶ drawback: many reductions to zero
- 2 F5 algorithm (Faugère '02)
 - ▶ elaborate criterion → skip unnecessary reductions
 - ▶ drawback: incomplete polynomial reductions

- multipurpose algorithms
- do not take advantage of the common shape of the systems
- knowledge of a prior computation
→ no more reduction to zero in F4 ?

Specifically devised algorithms

Outline of our F4 variant

- 1 F4Precomp: on the first system
 - ▶ at each step, store the list of all involved polynomial multiples
 - ▶ reduction to zero \rightarrow remove well-chosen multiple from the list
- 2 F4Remake: for each subsequent system
 - ▶ no queue of untreated pairs
 - ▶ at each step, pick directly from the list the relevant multiples

Former works

- Gröbner basis over \mathbb{Q} using CRT and modular computations
- Traverso '88: analysis of *Gröbner trace* for rational Gröbner basis computations with Buchberger's algorithm

Analysis of F4Remake

“Similar” systems

- parametric family of systems: $\{F_1(y), \dots, F_r(y)\}_{y \in \mathbb{K}^\ell}$
where $F_1, \dots, F_r \in \mathbb{K}[Y_1, \dots, Y_\ell][X_1, \dots, X_n]$
- $\{f_1, \dots, f_r\} \subset \mathbb{K}[\underline{X}]$ random instance of this parametric family

Generic behaviour

- “compute” the GB of $\langle F_1, \dots, F_r \rangle$ in $\mathbb{K}(\underline{Y})[\underline{X}]$ with F4 algorithm
- f_1, \dots, f_r behaves generically if during the GB computation with F4
 - ▶ same number of iterations
 - ▶ at each step, same new leading monomials \rightarrow similar critical pairs

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F4Remake computes successfully the GB of f_1, \dots, f_r
if the system behaves generically

Algebraic condition for generic behaviour

- 1 Assume f_1, \dots, f_r behaves generically until the $(i - 1)$ -th step
- 2 At step i , F4 constructs
 - ▶ M_g =matrix of polynomial multiples at step i for the parametric system
 - ▶ M =matrix of polynomial multiples at step i for f_1, \dots, f_r

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- 3 Reduced row echelon form of M_g and M

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \overbrace{LT(M)} \\
 \left. \begin{array}{c} s \\ \left(\begin{array}{c|cc}
 A_{g,0} & & \\
 0 & A_{g,1} & \\
 \hline
 A_{g,3} & & A_{g,2}
 \end{array} \right)
 \end{array} \right)
 \end{array}
 \quad
 \begin{array}{c}
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$$\left(\begin{array}{c|c} I_s & B_{g,1} \\ \hline 0 & B_{g,2} \end{array} \right) \quad \left(\begin{array}{c|c} I_s & B_1 \\ \hline 0 & B_2 \end{array} \right)$$

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$$\text{RTZ} \left\{ \begin{pmatrix} I_s & & & B_{g,1} \\ \hline 0 & \text{---} & & \\ & & 0 & \end{pmatrix} \right. \quad \left. \begin{pmatrix} I_s & & & B_1 \\ \hline 0 & & & B_2 \end{pmatrix} ? \right.$$

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$$\left(\begin{array}{c|c|c} I_s & 0 & C_{g,1} \\ \hline 0 & I_\ell & C_{g,2} \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 0 \end{array} \right) \quad \left(\begin{array}{c|c|c} I_s & & B'_1 \\ \hline 0 & B & B'_2 \end{array} \right) ?$$

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$$\left(\begin{array}{c|c|c} I_s & 0 & C_{g,1} \\ \hline 0 & I_l & C_{g,2} \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 0 \end{array} \right)$$

$$\left(\begin{array}{c|c|c} I_s & & B'_1 \\ \hline 0 & B & B'_2 \end{array} \right)$$

f_1, \dots, f_r behaves generically at step $i \Leftrightarrow B$ has full rank

Probability of success

Heuristic assumption

- The B matrices are uniformly random over $\mathcal{M}_{n,\ell}(\mathbb{F}_q)$
- The probabilities that the B matrices have full rank are independent

Probability estimates over \mathbb{F}_q

The probability that a system f_1, \dots, f_r behaves generically is heuristically greater than $c(q)^{n_{step}}$ where

- n_{step} is the number of steps during the F4 computation of the parametric system $F_1, \dots, F_r \in \mathbb{K}(\underline{Y})[\underline{X}]$

- $$c(q) = \prod_{i=1}^{\infty} (1 - q^{-i}) = 1 - 1/q + O_{q \rightarrow \infty}(1/q^2)$$

Application to index calculus method for ECDLP

Joux-V. approach

ECDLP: $P \in E(\mathbb{F}_{q^n})$, $Q \in \langle P \rangle$, find x such that $Q = [x]P$

- find $\simeq q$ decompositions of random combination $R = [a]P + [b]Q$ into $n - 1$ points of $\mathcal{F} = \{P \in E(\mathbb{F}_{q^n}) : x_P \in \mathbb{F}_q\}$
- solve $\simeq q^2$ overdetermined systems of n eq. and $n - 1$ var. over \mathbb{F}_q
- heuristic assumption makes sense

Experimental results on $E(\mathbb{F}_{p^5})$, p odd (Joux-V.)

- system of 5 eq / 4 var over \mathbb{F}_p , total degree 8
- Precomputation done in 8.963 sec, 29 steps, $d_{reg} = 19$

size of p	est. failure proba.	F4Remake ¹	F4 ¹	F4/F4Remake	F4 Magma ²
8 bits	0.11	2.844	5.903	2.1	9.660
16 bits	4.4×10^{-4}	3.990	9.758	2.4	9.870
25 bits	2.4×10^{-6}	4.942	16.77	3.4	118.8
32 bits	5.8×10^{-9}	8.444	24.56	2.9	1046

Step	degree	F4Remake matrix sizes	F4 matrix sizes	ratio
14	17	1062×3072	1597×3207	1.6
15	16	1048×2798	1853×2999	1.9
16	15	992×2462	2001×2711	2.2
17	14	903×2093	2019×2369	2.5
18	13	794×1720	1930×2000	2.8

¹2.93 GHz Intel Xeon processor

²V2.15-15

Results in characteristic 2

The IPSEC Oakley key determination protocol 'Well Known Group' 3 curve

The Oakley curve: an interesting target

$$\mathbb{F}_{2^{155}} = \mathbb{F}_2[u]/(u^{155} + u^{62} + 1)$$

$$E : y^2 + xy = x^3 + (u^{18} + u^{17} + u^{16} + u^{13} + u^{12} + u^9 + u^8 + u^7 + u^3 + u^2 + u + 1)$$

$$G = E(\mathbb{F}_{2^{155}}),$$

$$\#G = 12 * 3805993847215893016155463826195386266397436443$$

Remarks

- this curve is known to be theoretically weaker than curves over comparable size prime fields (GHS)
- we show that an actual attack on this curve is feasible.

Attack of Oracle-assisted Static Diffie-Hellman Problem

Granger-Joux-V.

Oracle-assisted SDHP

G finite group and d secret integer

- Initial learning phase: the attacker has access to an oracle which outputs $[d]Y$ for any $Y \in G$
- After a number of oracle queries, the attacker has to compute $[d]X$ for a previously unseen challenge X

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Attack on the Oakley curve

- learning phase: ask the oracle $Q = [d]P$ for each $P \in \mathcal{F}$ where $\mathcal{F} = \{P \in E(\mathbb{F}_{2^{155}}) : P = (x_P, y_P), x_P \in \mathbb{F}_{2^{31}}\}$
- find a decomposition of $[r]X$ (r random) in a sum of 4 points in \mathcal{F}
 \leftrightarrow solve $\simeq 5 \cdot 10^{10}$ systems of 5 eq / 4 var over $\mathbb{F}_{2^{31}}$, total deg 8

Results for the 'Well Known Group' 3 Oakley curve

Timings

- Magma (V2.15-15): each decomposition trial takes about 1 sec
- F4Variant + dedicated optimizations of arithmetic and linear algebra
 - only **22.95 ms** per test on a 2.93 GHz Intel Xeon processor
 - $\simeq 400\times$ faster than results in odd characteristic

Feasible attack : oracle-assisted SDHP solvable in ≤ 2 weeks with 1000 processors after a learning phase of 2^{30} oracle queries

Limits of the heuristic assumption

Specific case

Parametric polynomials with highest degree homogeneous part in $\mathbb{K}[\underline{X}]$

- heuristic assumption not valid
- but generic behaviour until the first fall of degree occurs

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Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar scheme

Security based on problem of solving multivariate quadratic systems

Recommended parameters: 16 eq., 32 (or 48) variables over $\mathbb{K} = \mathbb{F}_{2^4}$

$$P_k = \sum_{i,j=1}^{48} a_{ij}^k x_i x_j + \sum_{i=1}^{48} b_i^k x_i + c^k, \quad k = 1 \dots 16$$

Limits of the heuristic assumption

Specific case

Parametric polynomials with highest degree homogeneous part in $\mathbb{K}[\underline{X}]$

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Recommended parameters : $m = 16$ eq, $n = 32$ (or 48) var over $\mathbb{K} = \mathbb{F}_{2^4}$

Hybrid approach [Bettale, Faugère, Perret]:

- fix $m - n$ variables and find a solution of the system with 16 eq / var
- exhaustive search over 3 more variables (overdetermined system)

$$P_k = \sum_{i,j=1}^{13} a_{ij}^k x_i x_j + \sum_{i=1}^{13} \left(b_i^k + \sum_{j=14}^{16} a_{ij}^k x_j \right) x_i + \left(\sum_{i,j=14}^{16} a_{ij}^k x_i x_j + \sum_{i=14}^{16} b_i^k x_i + c^k \right)$$

UOV and Hybrid approach example

Goal : compute GB of systems $S_{x_{14}, x_{15}, x_{16}} = \{P_1, \dots, P_{16}\}$ for all $(x_{14}, x_{15}, x_{16}) \in \mathbb{F}_{2^4}^3$ where

$$P_k = \sum_{i,j=1}^{13} a_{ij}^k x_i x_j + \sum_{i=1}^{13} \left(b_i^k + \sum_{j=14}^{16} a_{ij}^k x_j \right) x_i + \left(\sum_{i,j=14}^{16} a_{ij}^k x_i x_j + \sum_{i=14}^{16} b_i^k x_i + c^k \right)$$

Resolution with F4Remake

- 6 steps, first fall of degree observed at step 5

$$\text{Proba}(S_{x_{14}, x_{15}, x_{16}} \text{ behaves generically}) \geq c(16)^2 \simeq 0.87$$

- exhaustive search: the probability observed on different examples is about 90%

UOV and Hybrid approach example

	F4Remake ¹	F4 ¹	F4 Magma ²	F4/F4Remake
Timing (sec)	5.04	16.77	120.6	3.3
Largest matrix	5913 × 7005	10022 × 8329	10245 × 8552	2.0

- precomputation done in 32.3 sec
- to be compared to the 9.41 sec of F5³ mentioned by Faugère et al.
- generically the GB is $\langle 1 \rangle$
 - solutions to be found among the non generic systems

¹2.6 GHz Intel Core 2 duo

²V2.16-12

³2.4 GHz Bi-pro Xeon

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Addendum: What about non genericity?

- 1 When the precomputation is correct:
 - ▶ correctness of F4Remake easy to detect: non generic behaviour as soon as we encounter a reduction to zero or a polynomial with smaller LT than expected
 - ▶ when F4Remake fails, continue the computation with classical F4
- 2 The precomputation is incorrect if:
 - ▶ F4Remake produces a leading monomial greater than the one obtained by F4Precomp during the same step
 - ▶ other possibility: execute F4Precomp on several systems and compare the lists of leading monomials

Addendum: Comparison with F5

Common features:

- elimination of the reductions to zero
- same upper bound for the theoretical complexity:

$$\tilde{O} \left(\binom{d_{reg} + n}{n}^\omega \right)$$

In practice, for the system on $E(\mathbb{F}_{p^5})$:

- F5 generates many redundant polynomials (F5 criterion) :
17249 polynomials in the GB before minimization
- F4 creates only 2789 polynomials
→ better behavior, independent of the implementation