

Improved criteria on the resistance against differential attacks

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
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Overview

- 1 Introduction to differential cryptanalysis
- 2 Classical criteria for substitution-permutation networks
- 3 New criteria on the resistance against differential attacks

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Substitution-permutation networks



Let m and t be two positive integers.

Notation

$\text{SPN}(m, t, S, M)$ defined over \mathbb{F}_2^{mt} :


Substitution function:

t copies of a permutation S of \mathbb{F}_2^m ;


Diffusion function:

a linear permutation M of \mathbb{F}_2^{mt} .

$\text{SPN}(m, 10, S, M)$:



Differential cryptanalysis [Biham-Shamir 90]



Attack: Find a, b such that, for almost all keys K ,

$$\Pr_x[E_K(x + a) + E_K(x) = b] \gg \frac{1}{2^n - 1}.$$

Security criterion

$\max_{a \neq 0, b \neq 0} \Pr_x[E_K(x + a) + E_K(x) = b]$ should be small for all K .

Notation

Let $(E_k)_k$ be an iterated cipher with r rounds.

- The *probability of an r -round differential (a, b) for a fixed key k* is

$$\text{DP}_r^{E_k}(a, b) = \Pr_X[E_k(X) + E_k(X + a) = b];$$

- The *expected probability of an r -round differential (a, b)* is

$$\text{EDP}_r^E(a, b) = 2^{-\kappa} \sum_{k \in \mathbb{F}_2^\kappa} \Pr_X[E_k(X) + E_k(X + a) = b];$$

- The *maximum expected probability for r rounds* is

$$\text{MEDP}_r^E = \max_{a \neq 0, b} \text{EDP}_r^E(a, b).$$

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Differential uniformity

Let S be a function from \mathbb{F}_2^m into \mathbb{F}_2^m . For any a and b in \mathbb{F}_2^m ,

$$\delta(a, b) = |\{x \in \mathbb{F}_2^m, S(x + a) + S(x) = b\}| .$$

- The *differential uniformity* of S is

$$\delta(S) = \max_{a \neq 0, b} \delta(a, b);$$

- The *differential spectrum* of S is the multi-set $\{\delta(a, b), a \in \mathbb{F}_2^m \setminus \{0\}, b \in \mathbb{F}_2^m\}$.

Sboxes with the same differential spectrum

Definition

Two permutations S and S' of \mathbb{F}_2^m are *affinely equivalent* if there exist two affine permutations of \mathbb{F}_2^m A_1 and A_2 such that $S' = A_2 \circ S \circ A_1$.


If S and S' are affinely equivalent, they satisfy

$$\delta_{S'}(a, b) = \delta_S(L_1(a), L_2^{-1}(b)), \quad \forall a, b \in \mathbb{F}_2^m,$$

where L_1 and L_2 correspond to the linear parts of A_1 and A_2 .

Differential probability of a two-round characteristic

Let $a = (a_1, \dots, a_t)$, $b = (b_1, \dots, b_t)$ and $c = (c_1, \dots, c_t)$ be nonzero elements of $(\mathbb{F}_2^m)^t$.



$$\text{ECP}_2(a, M(c), b) \leq \left(\frac{\delta(S)}{2^m}\right)^{\text{wt}(c)} \left(\frac{\delta(S)}{2^m}\right)^{\text{wt}(M(c))} .$$

Branch number

Let M be a permutation of $(\mathbb{F}_2^m)^t$. We associate to M the code \mathcal{C}_M of length $2t$ and size 2^t over \mathbb{F}_2^m defined by

$$\mathcal{C}_M = \{(c, M(c)), c \in (\mathbb{F}_2^m)^t\}.$$

The *branch number* d of M is the minimum distance of \mathcal{C}_M .

Singleton's bound:

The minimum distance d of the code \mathcal{C}_M satisfies

$$d = \min_{c \neq 0} wt(c, M(c)) \leq t + 1,$$

with equality for MDS codes (Maximum Distance Separable).

AES-128 [Daemen-Rijmen 98], [FIPS PUB 197]

- Key-alternating block cipher;
 - Block size: 128 bits;
 - Key size: 128 bits;
 - 10 rounds;
 - Round-permutation: concatenation of 4 SPN(8, 4, S, M);
- ▶ $S(x) = L \circ \psi^{-1} (\psi(x)^{254})$
 where ψ is an isomorphism from \mathbb{F}_2^8 into the field \mathbb{F}_{2^8} and L is an affine permutation of \mathbb{F}_2^8 ;
- ▶ M is a linear permutation of $(\mathbb{F}_2^8)^4$ with branch number 5.
- $$\Rightarrow \max_{a,c,b} \text{ECP}_2(a, M(c), b) \leq 2^{-6 \times 5}.$$

Characteristics vs. differentials

But we need to estimate the value of

$$\text{EDP}_2(a, b) = \sum_{c \in \mathbb{F}_2^{mt}} \text{ECP}_2(a, M(c), b).$$

Let $(E_k)_k$ be a block cipher of the form $\text{SPN}(m, t, S, M)$ where M is a linear permutation with branch number d . We have:

$$\text{MEDP}_2^E \leq \left(\frac{\delta(S)}{2^m} \right)^{d-1}.$$

FSE 2003 bound (for differentials):

[Chun *et al.* 03], [Park *et al.* 03]

Let $(E_k)_k$ be a block cipher of the form $\text{SPN}(m, t, S, M)$ where M is a linear permutation with branch number d . Then,

$$\text{MEDP}_2^E \leq 2^{-md} \max \left(\max_{a \in (\mathbb{F}_2^m)^*} \sum_{\gamma \in (\mathbb{F}_2^m)^*} \delta(a, \gamma)^d, \max_{b \in (\mathbb{F}_2^m)^*} \sum_{\gamma \in (\mathbb{F}_2^m)^*} \delta(\gamma, b)^d \right).$$

Difference table

$$\max \left(\max_{a \in (\mathbb{F}_2^m)^*} \sum_{\gamma \in (\mathbb{F}_2^m)^*} \delta(a, \gamma)^d, \max_{b \in (\mathbb{F}_2^m)^*} \sum_{\gamma \in (\mathbb{F}_2^m)^*} \delta(\gamma, b)^d \right)$$

	$\begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$
(0,0,0,1)	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2
(0,0,1,1)	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4
(0,1,0,1)	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0
(1,1,1,1)	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0
(0,0,1,0)	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0
(0,1,1,0)	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0
(1,0,1,0)	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2
(1,1,0,1)	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0
(0,1,0,0)	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
(1,1,0,0)	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0
(0,1,1,1)	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0
(1,0,0,1)	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2
(1,0,0,0)	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2
(1,0,1,1)	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0
(1,1,1,0)	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2

Results for AES

FSE 2003 bound for AES:

$$\text{MEDP}_2 \leq 79 \times 2^{-34}.$$

Exact value for AES with the naive Sbox (i.e. the inverse function $\psi^{-1}(\psi(x)^{254})$):

$$\text{MEDP}_2 = 79 \times 2^{-34}.$$

Exact value for AES [Keliher-Sui 07]:

$$\text{MEDP}_2 = 53 \times 2^{-34}.$$

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New bound on MEDP₂

Notation:

A block cipher $(E_k)_k$ is denoted by $\text{SPN}_F(m, t, S, M)$ if it is a Substitution-Permutation Network over $(\mathbb{F}_{2^m})^t$ where:

- S is a permutation of \mathbb{F}_{2^m} ;
- M is an \mathbb{F}_{2^m} -linear permutation of $(\mathbb{F}_{2^m})^t$.

New bound:

Let d be the branch number of M and

$$\mathcal{B}(\mu) := \max_{1 \leq u < d} \max_{a, b, \lambda \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}^*} \sum_{\gamma \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}^*} \delta(a, \gamma)^u \delta(\gamma \lambda + \mu, b)^{d-u}, \quad \mu \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}.$$

Then,

$$\text{MEDP}_2 \leq 2^{-md} \max_{\mu \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}} \mathcal{B}(\mu).$$

Difference table

$$\sum_{\gamma \in \mathbb{F}_2^{*m}} \delta(a, \gamma)^u \delta(\gamma, b)^{d-u}.$$

	1	α	α^2	α^3	α^4	α^5	α^6	α^7	α^8	α^9	α^{10}	α^{11}	α^{12}	α^{13}	α^{14}
1	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2
α	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4
α^2	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0
α^3	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0
α^4	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0
α^5	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0
α^6	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2
α^7	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0
α^8	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
α^9	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0
α^{10}	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0
α^{11}	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2
α^{12}	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2
α^{13}	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0
α^{14}	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2

Difference table

$$\sum_{\gamma \in \mathbb{F}_2^*} \delta(a, \gamma)^u \delta(\gamma, b)^{d-u}.$$

	1	α	α^2	α^3	α^4	α^5	α^6	α^7	α^8	α^9	α^{10}	α^{11}	α^{12}	α^{13}	α^{14}
1	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2
α	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4
α^2	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0
α^3	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0
α^4	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0
α^5	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0
α^6	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2
α^7	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0
α^8	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
α^9	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0
α^{10}	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0
α^{11}	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2
α^{12}	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2
α^{13}	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0
α^{14}	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2

Difference table

$$B(\mu) = \max_{1 \leq u < d} \max_{a, b, \lambda \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}^*} \sum_{\gamma \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}^*} \delta(a, \gamma)^u \delta(\gamma \lambda + \mu, b)^{d-u}.$$

	1	α	α^2	α^3	α^4	α^5	α^6	α^7	α^8	α^9	α^{10}	α^{11}	α^{12}	α^{13}	α^{14}
1	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2
α	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4
α^2	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0
α^3	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0
α^4	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0
α^5	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0
α^6	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2
α^7	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0
α^8	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
α^9	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0
α^{10}	2	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0
α^{11}	2	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2
α^{12}	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2
α^{13}	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0
α^{14}	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2

New bound on MEDP₂

Let $(E_k)_k$ be a block cipher of the form $\text{SPN}_F(m, t, S, M)$ where M has branch number d .

Let

$$\mathcal{B}(\mu) := \max_{1 \leq u < d} \max_{a, b, \lambda \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}^*} \sum_{\gamma \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}^*} \delta(a, \gamma)^u \delta(\gamma \lambda + \mu, b)^{d-u}, \quad \mu \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}.$$

Then,

$$\text{MEDP}_2 \leq 2^{-md} \max_{\mu \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}} \mathcal{B}(\mu).$$

Result for AES:

$$\text{MEDP}_2 \leq 55.5 \times 2^{-34}.$$

Optimality of the new bound

Theorem

This bound is smaller or equal to the FSE 2003 bound, with equality if S is an involution.

Theorem

Let S be a permutation of \mathbb{F}_{2^m} and t be any integer with $t \leq 2^{m-1}$. Then, there exists a linear diffusion layer M over $(\mathbb{F}_{2^m})^t$ such that C_M is MDS and the cipher $\text{SPN}_F(m, t, S, M)$ satisfies

$$\text{MEDP}_2^E \geq 2^{-m(t+1)} \mathcal{B}(0).$$

Examples

SPN(4, 4, S_6 , M), where S_6 can be used in the cipher Prince [Borghoff *et al.*, 12]:

- for any \mathbb{F}_2 -linear permutation M of \mathbb{F}_2^{16} with $d = 5$, FSE 2003 bound gives:

$$\text{MEDP}_2^E \leq 34 \times 2^{-14};$$

- for any M linear over \mathbb{F}_{2^4} with $d = 5$, where \mathbb{F}_{2^4} is identified with \mathbb{F}_2^4 by $\{1, \alpha, \alpha^2, \alpha^3\}$, α a root of $X^4 + X^3 + X^2 + X + 1$:

$$\text{MEDP}_2^E \leq 33 \times 2^{-14};$$

- there exists M' linear over \mathbb{F}_{2^4} with $d = 5$, where \mathbb{F}_{2^4} is identified with \mathbb{F}_2^4 by $\{1, \beta, \beta^2, \beta^3\}$, β a root of $X^4 + X + 1$, such that:

$$\text{MEDP}_2^E = 34 \times 2^{-14}.$$